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Grey Market Imports: In or Out?-
Vivitar v. United States
A new Mercedes Benz for twenty-five percent less than sticker
price?! Read the advertisements in any prominent newspaper.
Newspapers are replete with ads for such items as Rolex watches,
luxury automobiles, and cameras at prices often well below normal
retail. Such products are termed grey market goods-goods im-
ported and sold frequently at greatly discounted prices because the
manufacturers' authorized distribution chain is bypassed.' Acquir-
ing grey market goods is simple. The most direct method is to take a
vacation to Germany, purchase the new Mercedes directly from the
manufacturer or a German dealer, and then ship the car to the
United States. Of course, emission devices are required before the
car is legal for U.S. highways. Considering the cost of the trip, the
cost of shipping the car to the United States, and the costs of Ameri-
canizing the car, the purchaser often spends less than he would if he
purchased, the Mercedes from a U.S. dealer.
A second method employed to bypass the authorized distribu-
tion system, and the subject of this note, is to purchase the car from
warehouses based in the United States that have employees in Ger-
many who buy the cars there and ship them to the United States.
The warehouse then Americanizes the cars and sells them to U.S.
consumers. The consumer gets a Mercedes and avoids the higher
prices charged by authorized Mercedes dealerships.
The victims of the importation of grey market goods are the do-
mestic distributors. Grey market imports have embroiled the United
States in an international trade war, with the consumer reaping the
benefits. Currently, the war is extremely fierce due in large part to
I See Riley, 'Gray Market' Fight Isn't Black and White, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at l,col.
3. Grey market goods should be distinguished from black market goods. While grey mar-
ket goods bear the genuine trademark and are thus genuine goods, black market goods are
counterfeits. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982) provides in relevant part that "no article of im-
ported merchandise which shall copy or simulate.., a trademark registered in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter ... shall be admitted to entry." In addition, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1526(b) (1982) provides for the seizure of such counterfeit goods by Customs officials.
But see A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689
(1923) (refusing to authorize the exclusion of imports bearing a trademark that accurately
described the manufacturing source for the goods because "copy or simulate" refers to
infringements, not genuine goods); Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoenig, 238 F. 780, 782
(2d Cir. 1916) (similar).
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the high value of the dollar abroad.2 Some estimates place the value
of grey market goods sold in the United States at $10 billion
annually.3
The potential for a grey market problem arises when a U.S.
trademark owner authorizes foreign companies to apply the trade-
mark to goods manufactured abroad. 4 Often the foreign companies
are authorized to market the trademarked goods within specified
countries or, at a minimum, outside the United States. So long as
the price of the goods in the United States is comparable to the price
of the goods abroad, there is no incentive for grey market importa-
tion. When the price of the goods in the United States is substan-
tially higher than the price abroad, which is often the case, 5 grey
marketers purchase the goods abroad, import and sell them to dis-
tributors, and thereby bypass the trademark owner's authorized
chain of distribution. 6 As the war rages, another battle front is the
courtroom, where the question is whether the grey market is legal
and whether it should be.
The view espoused by critics of the grey market is generally that
grey marketers "free ride" illegally on trademark owners' invest-
ments in advertising, customer service, and development of recog-
nizable and respected brand names. The grey marketers, on the
other hand, contend their actions do nothing more than promote
healthy intrabrand competition, thereby benefitting the competitive
system and ultimately the consumer.
These conflicting arguments were presented to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit in Vivitar Corp. v. United States. 7 The
owner of the "Vivitar" trademark initially filed an action in the Court
of International Trade seeking a declaratory judgment8 that the Cus-
2 Riley, supra note 1, at 1, col. 3.
3 See id. at 1, col. 4. "[I]t may account this year for as many as 65,000 luxury cars,
one out of every three cameras sold in this country and up to 20 percent of the sales
volume of such nationwide discounters as K-Mart Corp." Id.
4 See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 423 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984),
aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). There are many
permutations of this problem.
5 Varying market conditions, such as low labor costs abroad as compared to those in
the United States, can result in a higher price for goods in the United States than that
charged abroad.
6 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555.
7 Id.
8 Vivitar sought a declaratory judgment before the Court of International Trade
based on 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982), which provides in relevant part:
it shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of for-
eign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package,
wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a cor-
poration or association created or organized within the United States, and
registered in the Patent and the Trademark Office ... unless written consent
of the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of making entry.
The remaining sections of 19 U.S.C. § 1526 deal with: (b) seizure and forfeiture of the
goods; (c) private remedies of trademark owners against persons dealing in wrongfully
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toms Service be required to exclude from entry all imports bearing
the "Vivitar" trademark that entered without the written consent of
the owner. 9 Vivitar licensed foreign manufacturers to apply its
trademark to specified photographic equipment.' 0 Vivitar's wholly
owned subsidiaries market these goods abroad but are not licensed
to market or import the goods into the United States. Both parties
agreed that parties unrelated to Vivitar imported goods manufac-
tured abroad without the written consent of Vivitar. II
The Customs Service, however, interprets 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)
pursuant to its regulations 12 to deny trademark owners the right to
demand exclusion of trademarked goods when the goods have been
manufactured under the authorization of the trademark owner.' 3
Such interpretation unquestionably narrows the explicit scope of the
statute. Due to the apparent conflict between section 1526(a) and
the Customs Service regulations, the Court of International Trade
determined the issue to turn on the proper construction of section
1526(a).
The Court of International Trade concluded Vivitar's reading of
section 1526(a) would result in a foreign manufacturer gaining com-
petitive advantage over a U.S. manufacturer when both produced
goods marketed worldwide.14 Because section 1526(a) explicitly ap-
plies to goods manufactured abroad,15 "the American manufacturer
would not be able to employ § 1526(a) to restrict unauthorized im-
ports of its goods sold by its overseas distributors."' 16 The court
determined that Congress could not have intended such a result 7
imported goods; (d) exemptions for personal use; and (e) special provisions for goods
bearing counterfeit marks. See id. §§ 1526(b)-(d).
9 Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 422.
1O Id.
'' Id. at 423.
12 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1985) provides in relevant part:
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical
with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corpora-
tion or association created or organized within the United States are subject
to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and
(b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned
by the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are par-
ent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common own-
ership and control (see §§ 133.2(d) and 133.12(d));
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or
trade name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
13 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 423.
14 Id. at 434.
15 See supra note 8.
16 I'ivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 434. The advantage of the foreign manufacturer is easily
achieved through the formation of a U.S. subsidiary that receives the trademark rights
from the foreign parent. The U.S. division is then able to assert § 1526(a) and thus restrict
unauthorized imports. See id.
1' Indeed, the court noted that in passing the Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318,
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and accordingly held that regulations followed by the Customs Ser-
vice were reasonable. 18
On appeal to the Federal Circuit,19 Vivitar renewed its challenge
to the regulations employed by the Customs Service. Vivitar at-
tempted to justify its authorized dealers' higher costs by explaining
the expenses incurred in warranty services, advertising, and promo-
tional activities.20 In addition, Vivitar alleged that discount houses,
as grey market distributors, obtained a "free ride" from the costs of
establishing customer loyalty and satisfaction, and that such under-
mining of Vivitar's system would ultimately destroy the reputation
and value of the Vivitar trademark. 2 1 In short, Vivitar's position was
that the Customs Service regulations were patently less protective of
the interests of a U.S. trademark owner than the literal language of
section 1526(a). Vivitar urged that the dispute be reconciled in favor
of the statute and the regulations accordingly invalidated. 22
The court maneuvered deftly and skirted the issue of the validity
of the regulations. After an exhaustive examination of the legislative
history of section 1526(a), the Federal Circuit refused to allow the
limitations in the regulations to be applied to section 1526.23
Though the Customs regulations would not limit the scope of sec-
tion 1526, the court nonetheless did not invalidate the regulations
but instead delineated their purpose. 24
The ruling required Vivitar to seek judicial remedies 25 against
grey marketers, and if successful, Vivitar was entitled to have the
42 Stat. 858 (1922), Congress was motivated largely by a desire to protect U.S. industry
from the perceived competitive advantage of foreign industry. See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at
434.
18 The court relied heavily on the legislative history of § 1526 and thus refused to
expand the reading of § 1526(a), stating that Congress apparently believed that trademark
owners were protected by common law and the statutory law of unfair competition. Id. at
433-36. See also infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
In partially limiting protection against goods bearing genuine marks, Customs imple-
ments its belief in congressional intent to protect U.S. businesses against fraud by foreign
assignors of trademarks. Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of
the United States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADE-MARK REP. 301, 305-06 (1969). "Clearly if the
American registered mark is owned or controlled by a foreign firm or an American firm
under foreign ownership or control, that intent is not being carried out. That is why the
Bureau does not interpret 1526(a) literally." Id. at 306.
19 761 F.2d at 1560-61, 1568-69.
20 Id. at 1556.
21 Id.
22 See id. at 1556-57, 1561.
23 See id. at 1569. The Customs regulations are without the authority to "affect the
actual scope of a trademark owner's rights" under the statute. Id.
24 The "regulations do no more than define Customs' role in initiating administrative
enforcement of the statute." Id. According to the court, because the regulations simply
define Customs' role, "the regulations are not contrary to the statute in the sense that goods
are being routinely excluded which should be admitted or vice versa" as Vivitar alleged.
Id. (emphasis in original).
25 See id. at 1570. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982) provides trademark owners with injunc-
tive and damages remedies against persons dealing in merchandise described in § 1526(a).
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goods excluded by Customs. 26 Thus, except in circumstances of a
clear violation of section 1526, Customs may refuse to exclude the
imports until adjudication by the district courts under the private
remedies provision of section 1526(c). 27
The Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade, as
noted, examined the legislative history in an attempt to determine
congressional intent regarding the breadth of section 1526. Section
1526(a) was enacted in response to the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in A. Bourjois and Co. v. Katzel.28 In Katzel
a French company manufactured face powder in France and sold it in
the United States under its trademark "Java." The French company
sold its entire U.S. operation and trademark to the plaintiff Bourjois.
The defendant Katzel bought the powder directly from the manufac-
turer and sold it in the original French packaging. Bourjois brought
suit claiming that Katzel's use of the "Java" trademark violated Bour-
jois' trademark rights. 29 The Second Circuit held that Katzel's use of
the "Java" trademark was in no way an infringement because the face
powder sold by Katzel was genuine.30
Congressional disfavor was such that section 1526(a) was en-
acted for the explicit purpose of overruling Katzel. The legislative
history, though sparse, notes clearly that the importation of mer-
chandise bearing the same trademark as merchandise in the United
States is unlawful without the consent of the owner of the U.S. trade-
26 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570. The court noted it was unaware of any instance in which
Customs refused to exclude imports after a judicial determination that exclusion was
proper. See id. at 1569.
27 See id. at 1570. See also supra note 25.
28 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). Suit was brought under 19
U.S.C. § 1526. See supra note 8 for the text of this provision.
29 260 U.S. at 690. The Katzel court did not address the issue of blocking importa-
tion, confining its discussion to trademark infringement. The question of exclusion under
current 15 U.S.C. § 1124 was raised, however, in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldrige, 263 U.S.
675 (1923) (per curiam). Under facts closely paralleling those in Katzel, Bourjois sought
relief against the Customs Service and the importer. The Supreme Court, on certification
from the Second Circuit, followed Katzel and found infringement with respect to the genu-
ine goods. In addition, the Court interpreted § 1124 to require Customs to exclude the
infringing goods from entry. See id. at 689.
310 "There is no exclusive right to the use of a name or symbol or emblematic device
except to denote the authenticity of the article with which it has become identified by
association." 275 F. at 541 (quoting Appollinaris and Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 20
(S.D.N.Y. 1886)).
Underlying Katzel and other decisions is the "universality" principle. Under this doc-
trine, U.S. trademark owners holding contracts for the exclusive right to import are power-
less as against others who purchase goods genuinely marked abroad and imported to the
United States for sale. See Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916);
Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1886). The universality principle provides
that if a trademark is lawfully affixed to merchandise in one country, the merchandise car-
ries the mark lawfully wherever the good goes, and cannot be deemed to infringe although
transported to another country where the exclusive right to the mark is held by someone
other than the owner of the merchandise. See Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trade-
marks and Goodwill, 47 VA. L. REV. 733, 744 (1961).
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mark.3t The sponsors of section 1526 made clear that the purpose
of the bill was to reverse Katzel and thus protect a U.S. trademark
owner who had purchased the right to use the trademark in the
United States from an independent foreign company. 32
Subsequent to the enactment of section 1526, the United States
Supreme Court decided Katzel3 3 and accordingly reversed the Sec-
ond Circuit. Though Katzel rightfully owned the face powder he
purchased, the Court held that "[o]wnership of the goods does not
carry the right to sell them ... at all in a given place."' 34 The Court
emphasized that the consuming public contemplates the goods as
originating with plaintiff though not manufactured by it. Thus, the
goods "could only be sold with the goodwill of the business that the
plaintiff bought."'35 According to the Court, because the face pow-
der did not emanate from the plaintiff as contemplated by the public,
Katzel's sales of the trademarked face powder infringed Bourjois'
rights.
The Supreme Court decision in Katzel arguably made the pas-
sage of section 1526 unnecessary. 36 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit addressed the need for section 1526(a) as well as its
breadth in Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc.3 7 The plaintiff in Sturges
sought to import for personal use 38 a used car bearing the trademark
"H-S." The U.S. trademark owner, Pease, refused to allow entry of
the car. The court stated that the object of section 1526 "is to pro-
tect the owner of a foreign trade-mark from competition in respect to
goods bearing the mark."' 39 Holding that the importation of the car
infringed Pease's trademark, the court denied entry. The trademark
owner's rights under section 1526(a) included the right to control
31 The Conference Report provides:
A recent decision of the circuit court of appeals holds that existing law does
not prevent the importation of merchandise bearing the same trademark as
merchandise of the U.S., if the imported merchandise is genuine and if there
is no fraud upon the public. The Senate amendment makes such importation
unlawful without the consent of the owner of the American trademark.
H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922).
32 See 62 CONG. REC. 11,604-05 (1922). Senator Sutherland, a proponent of the bill,
noted that § 1526(a) does nothing more than prevent the defrauding of U.S. citizens who
have purchased trademarks from foreign businesses that violate the property rights of the
purchasers of the trademarks by shipping over to the United States goods under those
identical trademarks. See id. at 11,603.
3 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
3 -1 Id. at 692.
35 Id.
3 See I'ivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565.
37 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931).
38 See id. at 1036. Under the current version of § 1526, this case would likely be dis-
posed of under § 1526(d)(1), which excepts from § 1526(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1124, im-
ported goods that accompany a "person arriving in the U.S. when such articles are for his
personal use and not for sale."
3 Sm wges, 48 F.2d at 1037. Judge Augustus Hand stated that allowing the importa-
tion of a car even for personal use might cause Pease to lose customers. Id.
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imports of all goods bearing the trademark to which it owned U.S.
rights. The court reasoned that the relationship of the U.S.
markholder and the foreign manufacturer was of no relevance. 40
The Sturges decision was cited in Osawa and Co. v. B & H Photo4 1
as authority for the territoriality principle, which provides that a
trademark's proper legal function is not necessarily to specify the or-
igin or manufacture
but rather to symbolize the domestic goodwill of the domestic
markholder so that the consuming public may rely with an expecta-
tion of consistency on the domestic reputation earned for the mark
by its owner and the owner of the mark may be confident that his
goodwill and reputation will not be injured through use of the mark
by others in domestic commerce.
4 2
Grounding its decision on the principle of territoriality, the court re-
jected the once-accepted principle of universality. 43 The basis of the
territoriality principle is the significance of the separate goodwill es-
tablished by the trademark owner in each country of distribution.44
The court reasoned that the reputation attached to the trademark of
a conscientious domestic distributor could be injured seriously if
grey marketers were free to import and sell the merchandise under
its trademark.45
The dispute in Osawa involved the "Mamiya" trademark, owned
by the foreign manufacturer of Mamiya cameras. Plaintiff, a domes-
tic company, owned the exclusive rights to the Mamiya mark in the
United States as well as the exclusive distribution rights of Mamiya
cameras in the United States. The action arose when defendant im-
ported Mamiya cameras into the United States, thereby bypassing
plaintiff's distribution network.46 The court enjoined others from
independently importing and dealing in goods.of the same manufac-
40 Id.
41 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Osawa focused on the right of a trademark
owner to enjoin the importation of goods bearing infringing trademarks under § 1124.
42 Id. at 1171-72. The principle of territoriality established "that two marks, even if
visually identical, regardless of who owns them, have independent legal existence based
upon the fact that they are created by different legal sovereigns." Certain Alkaline Batter-
ies, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 823, 849 (Int'l Trade Comm'n 1984) (views of Chairwoman Stern
and Comm'r Rohr), disapproved by President Reagan pursuant to 19 USC. § 1337(a) (1982), 50
Fed. Reg. 1655, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 862, appeal dismissed sub nora. Duracell, Inc.
v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as
Duracell].
43 Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1171-74.
44 See id. at 1173.
45 See id.
46 See id. at 1165. In Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp.
1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983), the plaintiff ini-
tially sought an injunction against importers and dealers of goods allegedly infringing
plaintiff's exclusive trademark rights. The lower court granted plaintiff a preliminary in-
junction after a finding of trademark infringement and a likelihood of confusion. See id. at
1079. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the injunction because plain-
tiff showed insufficient evidence of a likelihood of irreparable harm. See id.; 719 F.2d at 45-
46.
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turer. Plaintiff had shown the requisite irreparable harm by the in-
herent customer confusion and deception 47 that occurred when
consumers purchased a grey market camera not covered by plain-
tiff's warranties, and the camera subsequently malfunctioned. 48
Thus, based on plaintiff's development of substantial goodwill ema-
nating from the goods themselves by such activities as its warranty
service and advertising, the plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary
injunction.49
The principle of territoriality in Osawa was the basis for the de-
termination of the United States International Trade Commission
(the Commission) in Certain Alkaline Batteries (Duracell).50 Duracell
was a manufacturer of alkaline batteries in the United States. The
corporation owning Duracell also wholly-owned a subsidiary in
Belgium. Duracell Belgium was authorized to manufacture batteries
in Belgium but prohibited from selling the batteries in the United
States.5 1 U.S. retailers soon discovered that they could purchase
Belgian Duracells at approximately one-half the price of domestic
Duracells, while selling the batteries at the same retail price.52
Duracell based its complaint on section 1337, 53 which declares unfair
methods of competition and unfair importation of goods to be un-
lawful when such acts have the effect or tendency of substantially in-
juring a domestic industry. The issue before the Commission was
whether there was a section 1337 violation when "merchandise pro-
duced by a foreign company affiliated with the U.S. complainant and
bearing" an identical trademark to the U.S. trademark was imported
and sold without the consent of the complainant. 54
The Commission characterized the above fact situation as the
grey marketers "reaping where they have not sown."'5 5 Underselling
47 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1168-70. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982) provides in pertinent
part:
(I) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution or advertising of any goods or services on or in connec-
tion with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive...
shall be liable in a civil action ....
48 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1167. 'he purchaser contacted plaintiff, who finds itself
in a predicament. Refusing to perform the warranty service on the grey market camera
would result in a dissatisfied customer, damaging the Mamiya reputation and thereby de-
creasing the value of the Mamiya trademark. Performing the warranty services, on the
other hand, imposes undeserved expenses on plaintiff because it received no revenue from
the initial sale of the grey market camera. See supra text accompanying note 42.
41) See Osawa, 589 F. Stipp. at 1174.
50 225 U.S.P.Q. at 823.
51 See id. at 825.
52 See id. at 826.
5 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
54 Duracell. 225 U.S.P.Q. at 826.
55 Id. at 831.
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Duracell at the wholesale level deprived Duracell USA of its profits,
which represent nothing more than the benefits of costly established
goodwill. 56 The only manner in which goodwill and profits could be
appropriated wrongfully is for the consumer to be deceived into
thinking that he is getting what he actually bargained for. The im-
porter argued that there was no possibility of consumer confusion
because the batteries were "genuine." The Commission, in a novel
approach, determined that even though the foreign-made batteries
were genuine, upon importation and sale in the United States, the
batteries became copies 57 promoting consumer confusion in viola-
tion of 15 U.S.C. § 1114.58 The consumer is not confused with re-
gard to the genuineness of the battery but as to the consumer's
"reasonable expectation" regarding the production, distribution,
and warranty of the batteries.5 9 Thus, the Commission determined
that exclusion of the Belgian Duracell batteries was warranted. 60
Section 1337, however, allows the President sixty days within which
to approve or disapprove the Commission's order of exclusion. 61
President Reagan subsequently overturned the order granted in
favor of Duracell.
In overturning the exclusion order in Duracell, the President
cited the recent case of Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American
Trademarks v. United States.62 Plaintiffs brought an action for declara-
tory and injunctive relief alleging that the Customs regulations 63
were inconsistent with 19 U.S.C. § 1526. The court held the regula-
tions valid on the basis of the legislative history of section 1526 and
56 See id. Duracell established goodwill through extensive advertising and its long-
standing reputation for producing quality batteries. The Commission stated that the
"function of the trademark law is to protect a trademark owner's investment in goodwill
because it is considered unfair to allow one to appropriate goodwill and profits which a
competitor has built up by quality and advertising in a trade symbol." Id. at 829.
57 See id. at 833-34. But see id. at 851 (views of Chairwoman Stern and Comm'r Rohr
that logically a thing cannot copy itself).
58 See supra note 47. See also El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World Inc., 599 F.
Supp. 1380, 1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (Lanham Act requires a "showing of likelihood of con-
fusion, that is, whether an appreciable number of purchasers is likely to be misled as to the
source or sponsorship of defendant's products"). Id.
5) See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 834. The Commission distinguished Monte Carlo
Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (Am.) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1056-58 (9th Cir. 1983), in which
the court found no infringement when the buyers got precisely what they bargained for.
The Commission determined that the purchasers of Belgium Duracell batteries were not
getting what they bargained for because there was no warranty coverage by Duracell USA,
as purchaser unquestionably assumed. See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 834-35.
1o The Commission refused to consider the relationship between Duracell USA and
Duracell Belgium, noting that § 1337 requires only injury to a domestic industry. See
Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 838. But cf. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (c)(I)-(c)(2) (1985) (denying exclu-
sion of grey market imports where the foreign and U.S. trademark holder are commonly
owned). See supra note 12 for text of regulations.
(" 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982).
62 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The plain-
tiffs were U.S. manufacturers and distributors of various trademarked products.
(i3 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1985). See supra note 12 for text of regulations.
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the consistent application and interpretation of the regulations by
the Customs Service. 64 The Katzel decision was distinguished by the
fact that the Coalition dispute did not involve the scenario in which
the same party owning trademark rights in the United States and
abroad authorized the application of the trademark on foreign-made
goods and then sought to enjoin the importation of those original
goods. 65
In addition to upholding the validity of the Customs regulations,
the court held that absent a Katzel situation-in which a foreign man-
ufacturer sells exclusive trademark rights in the U.S. and then estab-
lishes another distributor to compete with the U.S. markholder-15
U.S.C. § 1124 applies only to "merchandise bearing counterfeit or
spurious trademarks that 'copy or simulate' genuine trademarks." 66
Thus, "genuine" goods manufactured under the authorization of the
U.S. markholder will not be considered infringing and entry into the
United States will be allowed.
Closely related to Coalition is the decision in Parfums Stern, Inc. v.
United States Customs Service.67 The court in Parfums found that plain-
tiff, the owner of a U.S. trademark for Oscar de la Renta perfume,
was the backbone in what appeared "to be a single international en-
terprise operating through an amoeba-like structure" to distribute
the perfume worldwide. 68 In fact, some of the enterprise's foreign
distributors apparently sold products to other entities for import
into the United States.69 Though plaintiff had established goodwill
in its business, the court denied relief because the plaintiff was seek-
ing protection for actions it caused through its own foreign manufac-
turing and distribution sources. 70
Though the court allowed importation of the grey market per-
fume in Parfums, the same court granted a permanent injunction
against the grey market importation in Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex
Corp.71 Selchow & Righter, the exclusive licensee of Trivial Pursuit
throughout the United States, had the right to exclude from importa-
tion the genuine goods originating from the foreign licensor. 72 The
court found Katzel controlling and stated expressly that Katzel had no
application to the Parfums situation. 73
Subsequent to the Federal Circuit's decision in Vivitar, Weil Ce-
64 Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 851-52.
65 Id. at 851.
66 Id. at 848.
67 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
68 Id. at 418.
69 See id. Customs seized the products and plaintiff brought action against the im-
porters under 19 U.S.C. § 1526. See id.
70 Id. at 419-21.
71 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
72 See id. at 28-29.
73 See id. at 29.
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ramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash was decided.74 Weil imported and dis-
tributed fine giftware. In 1966 Weil was granted the exclusive U.S.
use of the "Lladro" trademark by the Spanish manufacturer of the
giftware. Plaintiff's complaint concerned defendant's distribution
and sale of goods bearing the "Lladro" trademark in the United
States without Weil's permission. The court cited Katzel and dis-
missed defendant's argument that "genuine" goods cannot cause
consumer confusion. 75
The court in Weil cited with approval the Vivitar decision con-
cerning the Customs regulation. In dictum the court stated that be-
cause Lladro and Weil are subject to common ownership, due to
Customs regulations, genuine Lladro goods would not be subject to
exclusion regardless of whether Weil had a case for trademark in-
fringement. 76 The Weil court, just as the Vivitar court, concluded
that the aggrieved distributor had available a private remedy under
section 1526(c) whereby the trademark owner could seek to have a
judicial determination of infringement and to have the goods
excluded.
Though section 1526(c) creates a private remedy against unau-
thorized importers and distributors, the adequacy of such remedy
may be questioned. Essentially, the U.S. trademark holder is forced
either to sue the distributors of the grey market merchandise, result-
ing in nothing more than treating the symptoms of the problem, or
police the borders in hopes of discovering the importer (the sup-
plier). The impossibility of preventing the entry of grey market
goods without the aid of Customs is readily apparent.
The court in Vivitar noted, however, that the Customs regula-
tions may not affect the actual scope of the trademark owner's
rights. 77 In addition, "[t]he regulations do no more than define Cus-
toms' role in initiating administrative enforcement of the statute," 78
the sole effective remedy. The court provided Customs with the op-
tion to refuse exclusion except in the most egregious situations. 79
As a practical matter, therefore, though the regulations are not ex-
pressly the limits of section 1526(a), Customs may continue to treat
them as such by refusing to exclude goods subject to the exception
in the regulations, basing that decision on the language in Vivitar that
"protection under the statute is unclear or depends upon resolution
74 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985).
75 See id. at 704-06. Weil sued for trademark infringement. The court concluded that
for Weil to maintain an action for infringement, it had to show separate, factually distinct
U.S. goodwill in the trademarked products, id. at 711, and the defendant's goods were
likely to confhse the consuming public. Id. at 713.
76 See id. at 747.
77 See O'itar, 761 F.2d at 1569.
78 Id.
79 See id. at 1570.
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of complex factual situations." 8 0
Although section 1526(a) was enacted in response to Katzel, that
section does not apply solely to the narrowest version of Katzel-type
facts. 8 ' Because the regulations narrow the scope of section 1526(a),
the court in Osawa questioned, albeit in dicta, whether Customs ex-
ceeded its authority.8 2 The court noted that section 1526(a)
"broadly and unqualifiedly" declares unlawful any goods of foreign
manufacture bearing a trademark owned by a U.S. citizen or busi-
ness.8 3 The U.S. trademark owner's relationship with a foreign
trademark holder was conspicuously absent.8 4
The district court in Vivitar stated that applying section 1526(a)
when a foreign importer is related to the U.S. trademark owner
could lead to a competitive advantage of a foreign manufacturer over
a U.S. manufacturer.8 5 Because section 1526(a) applies to goods
manufactured abroad, the foreign manufacturer could form a U.S.
subsidiary to which all the U.S. trademark rights could be trans-
ferred.8 6 The U.S. subsidiary would then employ section 1526(a) to
restrict unauthorized imports of the foreign manufacturer's goods.
The competitive response by the domestic trademark owner would
require moving its manufacturing operation abroad so it could like-
wise restrict the importation of its goods.8 7
The court's reasoning was fallacious in one of two ways: either
(1) it overlooked the fact that trademark rights preclude one from
infringing another trademark thereby preventing the foreign manu-
facturer in the example from granting two U.S. trademark rights or
(2) the court reasoned that somehow the domestic manufacturer
would be harmed by having goods it exported to its foreign distribu-
tors reimported to the United States. 88  I
One problem suggested by the district court in Vivitar is the
manner of applying the territoriality principle when goods are manu-
factured in the United States and abroad under identical trade-
80 Id.
81 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1175.
82 See id. at 1177. It should be noted that the court expressly stated that deciding the
validity of the regulations was not necessary for the adjudication of the Osawa dispute. See
id.
83+ See id.
84 See id. The Osawa court reasoned that the regulations were promulgated as a result
of antitrust concerns. Although antitrust problems could arise, ample remedies under the
Sherman Act existed. See id. at 1178.
85 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 434. On appeal, the Second Circuit did not address this
portion of the district court's opinion.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 It is a sad state of affairs if a U.S. manufacturer could be undersold in the United
States by its own foreign distributors. If that is the case, the United States deserves to be
disadvantaged.
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marks.8 9 The territoriality principle provides that the legal function
of a trademark is not necessarily to specify the origin of manufacture
but rather to protect the goodwill established by a markholder. 90 Ig-
noring the further problem of international goodwill, exclusion is
likely warranted when the U.S. markholder has established separate
goodwill in the product in the United States. In addition, a literal
reading of section 1526(a) would provide for exclusion because the
imported goods are of foreign manufacture. Because Vivitar did not
apply section 1526(a) literally, however, the result is uncertain.
The public policy arguments concerning the entry or exclusion
of grey market goods are well established and refined by the compet-
ing interests. The major policy reason for allowing the entry of grey
market goods is the promotion of competition, ultimately benefitting
the consumer with lower prices. The corollary to the competitive
argument is that refusing entry to grey market goods encourages the
U.S. trademark holder to engage in monopolistic price discrimina-
tion.9 1 Price discrimination would be possible only, however, in in-
stances when the trademark holder had no domestic competitors.
For example, Canon USA, the exclusive trademark holder of the
"Canon" trademark, is not monopolizing the camera market because
of the presence of Nikon, Kodak, and others. In addition, assuming
monopolization is possible, there are significant antitrust statutes to
attack a monopolistic condition.
A persuasive argument for allowing entry of grey market goods,
though apparently never addressed by the courts, is the effect on
U.S. industry and capital structure when the goods are denied entry.
Assuming for example, the absence of the Customs regulations that
allow entry to grey market goods where the foreign manufacturer
and the U.S. markholder are related, a shoe company, "Flash," sets
up manufacturing operations in the Philippines. Flash Company
transfers the exclusive U.S. use of the "Flash" trademark to a U.S.
subsidiary. Flash Company pays the Filipino workers five dollars a
day to make its shoes which sell for forty dollars in the United States.
Flash is able to avoid higher domestic labor costs while taking advan-
tage of higher shoe prices due in no small part to its trademark and
the exclusion of any and all "Flash" shoes under section 1526(a).
Thus, section 1526, which as noted was enacted in part to protect
U.S. industry, is turned on its head, resulting in Flash having its cake
and eating it too.
How is Flash able to charge forty dollars for a pair of shoes?
Either Flash has a monopoly on sports shoes in the United States or
89 See Supnik, The Bell and Howell: Mamiya Case-Where Now Parallel Imports, 74
TRADE-MARK REP. 1 (1984).
90 See supra text accompanying note 42.
91 See generally Duracell, supra note 42. The markholder could charge a higher price in
the United States where he has more market power.
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Flash has developed goodwill in its shoes (and therefore its trade-
mark) through a quality product, extensive advertising, and/or other
customer relations. Trademarks may be regarded by many consum-
ers as guarantees of quality, thereby justifying a higher price on a
trademark item. Granting entry to grey market goods arguably al-
lows the grey marketer to benefit because of the goodwill established
by the domestic trademark holder. The logical conclusion of this
argument may be a decrease in investment in industries that rely on
the reputation of their trademarks.
Considering that purchasers of grey market merchandise get the
genuine goods, 92 the quality of grey market goods should equal the
quality of goods purchased through the markholder's distribution
network. In addition, grey market distributors maintain they adver-
tise their products and establish goodwill in their businesses.
The problem of customer service arises following the sale of a
grey market good. As the court noted in Osawa, the average con-
sumer will not understand that his camera is not covered by a war-
ranty of the authorized U.S. distributor, as is the case with grey
market goods. The domestic markholder contends that this confu-
sion created by the lack of warranties presents two alternatives,
neither of which is attractive: (1) perform the warranty service on
the grey market good to maintain goodwill in the trademark or
(2) refuse to perform the services after an explanation to the
consumer.
Though it is undeniable that domestic markholders have a
strong argument regarding warranties, it is highly questionable
whether this situation demands the drastic measure of exclusion.
The domestic markholder deserves protection from action the effect
of which infringes on costly established goodwill. On the other
hand, the trademark should not allow the holder carte blanche to
exploit consumers in a monopolistic fashion. The grey marketers
could perform a valuable check on this system to ensure the consum-
ing public is not gouged. An additional check is needed, however, to
prevent the grey marketers from exploiting the efforts of the domes-
tic markholder. Due to the persuasive competing arguments con-
cerning exclusion, a compromise is needed falling between
unencumbered entry and total exclusion.
One such compromise would require the outer wrapper of a
grey market good to identify itself as such and expressly disclaim any
connection to the domestic markholder. Such a disclaimer would
have to be clear and unambiguous so that the average consumer
would appreciate that the grey market good has no connection with
the domestic markholder. Along with protecting the domestic
92 Note that 15 U.S.C. § 1124 bars entry to goods that copy or simulate.
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markholder, consumers should realize that grey market goods
should sell at prices well below that of the warrantied, legitimate
goods.
Such consumer knowledge should prevent Duracell-type occur-
rences, in which the grey market batteries were sold at the same price
as the warrantied batteries. Simply put, consumers foregoing the
privilege of warrantied goods will expect something in return,
namely a price offset. Whether such a compromise will remedy the
grey market problem remains to be seen. A standardized scheme for
Customs and the courts to follow is demanded. Congress should
legislate regarding grey market imports before the courts are
flooded with litigation and markholders and grey marketers have no
inkling as to their rights and/or obligations.
-G. KENNETH STEPHENS, JR.

